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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the short-term shareholder wealth effects to U.S. bank 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that were announced and completed between 
1989 and 2004. Using various event windows, the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) to target firms are positive, bidder firm abnormal returns are negative, and 
the combined CARs are positive. This result is consistent with the synergy and 
hubris hypothesis wherein bank M&As are wealth-creating events as synergies 
exist; however, bidders may overpay to realize these gains.  
 The M&As are examined by the method with which they are financed, 
namely, cash, or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, versus stock only. The 
target, bidder and combined mean CARs for M&As that are financed by a cash or 
combination payment are higher than those that are financed by stock for the full 
sample period and the 1999 – 2003 sub-sample period. Furthermore, the results 
indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between the bidder and 
combined CARs and cash or combination payments. 
 Further evidence presented suggests a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the target CARs and whether the M&A is geographically 
focusing (intrastate), with no corresponding relationship existing for the bidder and 
combined firms. Results, however, do indicate that the mean combined CARs are 
higher for intrastate compared to interstate M&As. In addition, the target, bidder and 
combined CARs are driven in part by the relative size of the merger parties.      
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As a result of deregulation, the banking industry has experienced mass 
consolidation. For example, there has been a 215% increase in the number of bank 
mergers from the 1980s to the 1990s and the percentage of bank mergers relative to 
all public mergers has increased from 8% in the 1980s to 15% in the 1990s (Becher 
(2000)). This study examines the short-term shareholder wealth effects to 854 
mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the U.S. banking industry during the 1989 
– 2004 time period. 
 Previous studies on bank mergers have consisted of samples that are 
relatively small, cover a short time horizon, and/or do not contain mergers that occur 
in the 21st century. For example, Becher (2000) studies 554 bank mergers from 1980 
– 1997, DeLong (2001) examines 280 mergers from 1988 – 1995, Esty, Narasimhan, 
and Tufano (1999) examine 477 mergers from 1980 – 1994, DeLong and DeYoung 
(2004) study 216 mergers from 1987 – 1999, and Anderson, Becher, and Campbell 
II (2004) study 97 bank mergers from 1990 – 1997.  Therefore, the constructed 
sample used in this study allows one to use the previous literature as a benchmark 
for comparison and enables one to conduct broader tests.  
Inclusion of the 21st century is of importance because it is during this time 
period that numerous corporate and accounting scandals occurred, as well as 
political unrest in the United States. As a result, investors were cautious regarding 
common stock valuations and it is therefore reasonable to believe that the short-term 
market reactions to bank M&As may have changed.   
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1.1 MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Although U.S. bank mergers and acquisitions have been examined at length, 
an empirical study that uses a recent sample does not exist to the best of this author’s 
knowledge. More specifically, the short-term valuation effects, as it relates to bank 
M&As in the 21st century, have not been studied to date. The 21st century is of 
importance as a number of key events took place which includes the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks and numerous corporate and accounting scandals, such as 
Enron and WorldCom, that resulted in investors being wary of common stock 
valuations and the stock market in general.  
The first objective of this study is to empirically examine the short-term 
shareholder wealth effects associated with bank M&As by analyzing the target, 
bidder and combined CARs. The analysis will also provide insight into the 
motivations behind the banking firms engaging in a merger or acquisition and 
whether the short-term market reaction has changed. 
As presented by Becher (2000), three alternate hypotheses that will be tested 
in the analysis of the target, bidder and combined CARs. First, synergies may be 
available through consolidation and enhanced by deregulation, as the number of 
potential M&As has increased. The synergy hypothesis states that the CARs to target 
firms should be positive, bidder CARs should be non-negative, and the combined 
abnormal returns should be positive. On the other hand, M&As may be the result of 
hubris and empire building (Roll (1986)) wherein mergers are not wealth-creating 
events. Under this hypothesis bidder firms simply pay too much to acquire the target 
firm for which two alternative explanations are offered. First, overpayment may 
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exist due to management’s belief that synergies exist when in fact they do not. 
Therefore, management overestimates their ability to create value. Second, the 
motivation for the bidder firm’s management to engage in a merger or acquisition 
may be empire building rather than for any synergistic reason. Under this scenario, 
the bidder firm’s management team seeks to build a large empire through active 
participation in the M&A market in order to entrench themselves through 
diversifying the common shareholder base. The hubris hypothesis predicts that the 
abnormal returns to the target firms are positive, the returns to bidder firms are 
negative, and the combined CARs are insignificant or negative. Alternatively, 
mergers may be a function of both the synergy and hubris hypotheses. If this is the 
case, the hypothesis predicts positive combined CARs, negative bidder firm returns, 
and positive target firm abnormal returns. The combined synergy and hubris 
hypothesis states that positive synergies are available, however, the bidder firm may 
overpay to acquire the synergies and in effect, may overestimate their ability to 
create value.    
A merger or acquisition is financed using cash, stock, or a combination 
payment. Thus, the second objective of this study is to determine whether the capital 
market reaction to the M&As differs depending on the payment method utilized; that 
is cash only, or a combination of cash, stock and/or debt, versus stock only. This 
analysis will be carried out for the target, bidder, and combined firms in the bank 
M&A sample. In addition, the number of M&As financed by each method of 
payment will be considered in order to determine whether there have been any 
changes regarding how banking firms finance M&As. 
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Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) describe two alternate hypotheses on why 
a firm finances their market for corporate control activities with cash or stock. First, 
cash acquisitions create an immediate tax liability for the shareholders of the target 
firm; whereas, stock payments are taxable only when they are sold. This results in 
the use of stock as the means of financing the merger or acquisition when the bid 
premium is large. Therefore, the tax effects hypothesis states that target shareholders 
prefer payment in stock. Second, the information asymmetries hypothesis states that 
if managers of bidder firms are better informed than outside investors with respect to 
the value of their firm, they will use stock to finance the acquisition of the target 
firm when they believe their stock is overvalued. Since investors realize this 
situation they tend to drive the price of the bidder’s stock down upon announcement 
of the merger or acquisition. Therefore, mergers financed via cash or debt is 
preferred unless the costs are excessive to insiders. However, this hypothesis 
contains another aspect that reaches a different conclusion when the stockholders of 
the target firm, who are better informed with respect to the value of their firm than 
outsiders prior to the merger, know their stock is undervalued. The implication is 
that the stockholders of the target firm prefer payment in stock so they are able to 
retain an equity position in the merged firm and realize the gains from the post-
merger revaluation.  
A third hypothesis is put forth by Fishman (1989) which states that cash is 
preferred to stock as the means to finance a merger when there is competition for the 
target firm. The use of cash to finance the merger or acquisition signals high 
valuation and deters potential or existing competitors. This hypothesis is interesting 
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due to the fact that the U.S. banking industry experienced significant increases in 
M&A activity, which, when coupled with regulatory changes, have resulted in 
potential mergers that were otherwise unavailable in the past. 
Deregulation has resulted in banks being permitted to acquire or merge with 
banks located in other states and countries. The third objective of this study is to 
determine whether the short-term wealth effects for the target, bidder and combined 
firms differ depending on whether the M&A is focusing (intrastate) versus 
diversifying (interstate) geographically. This will provide insight into the capital 
market effects of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
(IBBEA).  
Intrastate M&As may be rewarded by the capital markets for various reasons 
such as the replacement of inefficient management, increased market power, 
reduction of overinvestment, or economies of scale and scope. The IBBEA has also 
increased the potential pool of target firms and this raises the possibility that an 
increased number of unprofitable mergers have resulted. Diversified firms, by being 
able to create value in various states, offer the potential to lower the risk to their cash 
flow’s. 
The fourth objective of this study is to explore the drivers and pattern of the 
target, bidder, and combined cumulative abnormal returns. More specifically, the 
analysis will seek to determine factors that influence the CARs and whether there 
are certain years, or time periods, where the short-term valuation effects have 
increased or decreased. This, in turn, will lend support to possible reasons why 
changes to the capital market reactions occurred. 
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1.2 OUTCOMES OF THE STUDY 
 For the full 1989 – 2004 sample period, the CARs to target firms are positive 
and statistically significant, the returns to bidder firms are statistically negative and 
the combined CARs are positive and statistically significant. These results are 
consistent with the synergy and hubris hypothesis wherein bank M&As create 
shareholder wealth, however, bidder firms may overpay to realize the synergies and, 
in essence, overestimate their ability to create value.  
Analysis indicates that the capital market reaction to a bank M&A differs 
depending on the method by which it is financed. For the target, bidder, and 
combined firms the mean CARs for those mergers that are financed by cash only, or 
a combination of cash, stock and/or debt are statistically greater than those that are 
financed by stock only. In addition, the regression analysis shows a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the bidder and combined CARs and a 
cash or combination payment, however, no such relationship exists for target firms. 
Also, for this sample the percentage of M&As financed by cash or a combination 
payment increases from roughly 20% in 1995 – 1998 to over 36% in 1999 – 2003. 
 The effects of the IBBEA are analyzed by classifying the M&As as 
geographically focusing (intrastate) or geographically diversifying (interstate) based 
on the headquarters of the target and bidder firms. It is found that there is no 
statistical difference in the mean CARs to the target and bidder firms. However, the 
abnormal returns to the combined firm are statistically greater for intrastate mergers 
compared to interstate mergers. Although there is no difference in the mean CARs 
for target firms, the results of the regression analysis indicate a positive and 
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statistically significant relationship between the CARs and whether the M&A is 
intrastate. 
 The results of this thesis also suggest that the CARs are driven in part by the 
relative size of the M&A parties. There is a negative and significant relationship 
between the relative size of the target firm to the bidder firm and the abnormal return 
to the target and bidder firms, and consistent with DeLong (2001), there is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the target-to-bidder ratio and the 
combined CARs. Furthermore, it is found that the CARs to the target firms are 
increasing in the latter years of the sample studied and could be the result of the 
increased use of cash or combination payments over this time frame. 
 An outline of this study is as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the legislative 
history of the U.S. banking industry and provides a review of the pertinent literature. 
Chapter 3 describes the data collection and sample selection processes, as well as the 
methodology with respect to the event study, independent group t-test, and 
regression analysis. Chapter 4 presents the summary statistics of the bank merger 
sample, the event study analysis, the comparison of the mean CARs based on 
method of payment and geographic location, and the results of the regression 
analysis. Chapter 5 provides a conclusion to the study and summarizes the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
 This chapter describes the evolution of and motivation behind the legislative 
changes that have had a direct impact on the structure of the U.S. banking industry. 
Furthermore, the pertinent literature on bank M&As will be reviewed. 
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2.1 HISTORY OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY 
 By 1933, the United States was in one of the worst depressions of its history. 
This affected the banking industry as over 11,000 banks (approximately 40%) had 
failed or were forced to merge. The President at the time, Theodore Roosevelt, 
closed all the banks in the country and conducted congressional hearings in order to 
deal with the economic and financial instability that the U.S. was experiencing.   
 The government responded with the Banking Act of 1933 that separated the 
activities of banks and securities firms. The Act prohibited commercial banks from 
owning brokerages and placed a wall between commercial and investment banking. 
This separation of activities was in response to the belief that commercial bank 
involvement with securities was detrimental to the Federal Reserve System because 
of unethical actions by corporate leaders thereby creating a climate that was 
responsible for bank failures.  
Many felt that it was improper for banks to risk large losses from 
underwriting insurance. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 addressed this 
issue as it created a barrier between banking and insurance. In addition, this law was 
enacted to slow the growth and power of financial-service conglomerates.  
However, the main weakness inherent in the banking industry was not 
addressed, specifically, unit banking within states and the prohibition of nationwide 
banking. It is argued that this structure was the principle reason behind bank failures 
that were common in the 1930’s as the failed banks generally had low asset levels.   
The McFadden Act of 1927 was at the heart of the problem as it gave power 
to the individual states to decide whether interstate M&A activity would be allowed, 
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but generally they did not. However, in order to avoid restrictions on interstate 
banking, financial firms formed bank holding companies in order to acquire banks in 
other states and then operate them under a single realm. To deal with this issue, the 
Douglas Amendment was applied to the Banking Holding Company Act that 
prohibited bank holding companies from acquiring banks outside the state where it 
was headquartered unless the target banks state permitted such acquisitions.  
Restrictions on a banks ability to expand within and across state lines were 
imposed at the state level and therefore changes in regulatory restrictions on 
expansion occurred at different times. Although the majority of the states passed 
laws allowing unrestricted intrastate (38 states by 1994) and interstate (all states 
except for Hawaii by 1992) branching, it was not until September 29, 1994 that the 
deregulatory process was complete with the passage of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) under federal legislation. 
 The IBBEA made it possible for bank holding companies to acquire banks in 
any state after September 29, 1994 and M&As between banks located in different 
states commencing June 1, 1997. Although the IBBEA permitted states to opt out of 
interstate branching only Texas and Montana chose to do so. In effect, the IBBEA 
rescinds the Douglas Amendment by eliminating the state regulations that once 
restricted interstate mergers by allowing bank holding companies to acquire banks 
located in other states. 
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2.2 REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
  Becher (2000) studies the short-term valuation effects of U.S. bank M&As. 
He finds that the target and combined CARs are positive and statistically significant, 
while bidder firm CARs are insignificant, or negative and statistically significant as 
the conclusions are not robust to the event window. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the abnormal returns to the bidder and combined firms are greater in the 1990s 
than that of the 1980s. The mergers are classified by method of payment, that is, 
stock versus cash, or a combination of cash, stock and/or debt. Analysis reveals that 
the CARs to the target and bidder firms are higher for cash or combination financed 
M&As. However, it is concluded that the higher CARs in the 1990s are not 
attributable to the payment method as the number of mergers financed by stock 
increased in the 1990s. When examining the mergers based on geographic location, 
it is suggested that because the percentage of intrastate mergers increases in the 
1990s that this might be the reason for the higher CARs. 
Delong (2001) finds that the target firm returns are positive and statistically 
significant, bidder firm returns are negative and statistically significant, and 
combined returns are statistically insignificant. Using a regression framework, the 
combined CARs are significantly influenced by whether the merger is both 
geographically and activity focusing. These M&As generate higher short-term 
abnormal returns than those that are geographically focusing and activity 
diversifying, geographically diversifying and activity focusing, and geographically 
diversifying and activity diversifying. When analyzing the returns to M&As in the 
1990s that focus solely on a geographical basis it is found that these types do not 
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generate a statistically significant CAR. The regression analysis also reveals no 
significant relationship between the combined CARs and the method of payment, 
but the CARs increase with the relative size of the target to the bidder firm.  
 Pilloff (1996) examines the combined CARs and finds that, in general, the 
CARs are statistically insignificant. There is evidence that the combined CARs are 
correlated with the difference between the bidder and target total expenses and target 
non-interest costs. This finding implies that abnormal returns are highest for those 
mergers that offer the opportunity for expense reduction; that is, mergers that 
provide the opportunity for increased efficiency. Furthermore, correlations between 
the abnormal returns and performance measures are insignificant and this means that 
market expectations are not related to future merger-related gains or losses. 
DeLong and DeYoung (2004) find that the CARs to target firms are positive 
and statistically significant, the CARs to bidder firms are negative and statistically 
significant, and the CARs to the combined firm are statistically insignificant. The 
target, bidder, and combined firm CARs are regressed against an intercept and a 
linear time variable and the results suggest that the market reaction to the mergers 
has not changed over the sample period. Furthermore, a regression analysis reveals 
that the average bank merger did not result in increased post-merger financial 
performance and the capital markets were unable to accurately predict the 
subsequent performance. However, the short-run market reactions and long-run 
post-merger financial performance of the bank mergers are positively correlated 
with the quantity of bank mergers during the previous three years. The authors refer 
to this as learning-by-observing wherein both the managers and investors 
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accumulate information about previous mergers in order to develop an 
understanding of which mergers perform well and conversely, which ones perform 
poorly. 
 Anderson, Becher, and Campbell II (2004) study the short-term market 
reaction to the announcement of bank M&As and find that, on average, the abnormal 
returns to bidder firms are negative and statistically significant, the target firm 
returns are positive and statistically significant, and the combined CARs are positive 
and statistically significant. Furthermore, the average CEO compensation increases 
significantly post-merger, but there is no relationship between post-merger CEO 
compensation and increases in asset size resulting from the merger. This implies that 
empire-building is not the primary motive for M&A activity. Rather, the results 
suggest that post-merger CEO compensation changes are related to the increase in 
the combined value of the bidder and target upon announcement of the merger. 
Hence, the observed CEO compensation changes are directly related to the potential 
gains of the mergers as assessed by the capital markets upon announcement.  
 Using a traditional event study methodology, Esty, Narasimhan, and Tufano 
(1999) find that the CARs to bidder firms are negative and statistically significant, 
while target firm abnormal returns are statistically significant and positive. The 
authors find that bank merger activity is negatively correlated with interest rates and 
interest rate changes and implies that the decision to acquire other banks is 
dependent on interest rates. Furthermore, there is limited evidence suggesting that 
the merger premium is related to the interest rate environment wherein bidder firms 
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pay a lower merger premium in a high interest rate environment and realize higher 
CARs upon merger announcement. 
 Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) examine a sample of large U.S. bank 
mergers from 1985 – 1996. The authors compute CARs for the combined firms, 
bidder firms, and target firms for the entire sample period as well as for the 1985 – 
1990 and 1991 – 1996 sub-sample time periods. For the overall sample period, the 
CARs for bidder firms are negative and statistically significant, the CARs to target 
firms are positive and statistically significant, and the combined CARs are positive 
and statistically significant. When comparing the two sub-samples, the bidder firm 
cumulative abnormal returns are statistically equal, however the target and combined 
CARs increase in the 1991 – 1996 time period. Evidence presented suggests that 
target and bidder bank merger announcement CARs are positively related to 
managements estimated cost savings through the elimination of overlapping 
operations and the consolidation of backroom operations, however the market 
appears to discount the projections put forth by management. The authors also 
suggest that mergers in the 1990s are more likely to include detailed projections of 
cost savings and should generate higher CARs than the M&As that occur prior to 
1990.  
 Hart and Apilado (2002) examine 22 interstate mergers that were announced 
between January 1, 1994 and June 1, 1997 in order to study the effects of the IBBEA 
on banks that were not active in the market for corporate control. The CARs to the 
target and combined firms are positive and statistically significant, whereas the 
abnormal returns to the bidder firms are negative and statistically insignificant. 
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Furthermore, the study illustrates that the market does not statistically distinguish 
between mergers that occurred pre-IBBEA versus post-IBBEA with regards to the 
CARs upon merger announcement. Evidence also suggests that improvements in the 
profitability of pre-IBBEA mergers are better than that of post-IBBEA mergers. This 
implies that because the IBBEA widened the pool of potential target banks, the 
IBBEA may have also increased the number of unprofitable merger combinations 
for inexperienced bidder banks in the market for corporate control. The authors also 
find that the market does not accurately predict how the merged bank will perform 
and that an attempt at such a prediction in the post-IBBEA time period comes with 
even greater uncertainty. 
 Houston and Ryngaert (1993) find that the target, bidder, and combined 
CARs are positive and statistically significant, negative and statistically significant, 
and statistically insignificant, respectively. Of the 153 mergers in the sample, 22 
were not completed and for these 22 potential mergers, the CARs are lower than 
those that are completed. The authors suggest that the target management and/or 
shareholders may choose to back out of a merger when they believe that the merger 
premium is too small. It is found that the abnormal returns to the target firms are 
increasing, the CARs to the bidder firms are becoming less negative, and 
consequently the combined CARs are increasing over the sample period.  
 James and Weir (1987) examined a sample of 60 bank mergers that occurred 
between 1972 and 1983. In contrast to more recent studies, the CARs to bidder firms 
are positive and statistically significant. Using a regression framework, the authors 
find that the CARs to the bidder firms are positively related to the number of 
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alternative target firms and are negatively related to the number of potential bidder 
firms. This implies the existence of substitute target and bidder firms. Furthermore, 
the relative size of the target to the bidder firm is positively related to the bidder firm 
CAR. 
 Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) examine 54 mergers in the European 
banking industry from 1988 – 1997. The target, bidder, and combined CARs are 
positive and statistically significant under various event windows, however, the 
results for the bidder firms are not robust to changes in the index used for estimating 
the market model. That is, if an industry index is used, the CARs to bidder firms are 
statistically insignificant because when a bank merger is announced, in general, bank 
stocks tend to rise. However, the positive and statistically significant CARs for 
bidder returns is interesting as this is contradictory to empirical results for bidder 
firms in the U.S. banking industry where the CARs are negative and statistically 
significant or insignificant. In addition, the combined CAR is statistically greater 
when the merger is domestic compared to cross-border.  
 Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah (2004) estimate value improvements 
from tender offers using the Probability Scaling and Intervention methods that 
address biases in conventional techniques. First, the conventional event study 
approach suffers from the truncation dilemma and arises when the announcement of 
an event does not ensure its eventual completion. The second problem is that returns 
related to an event may be contaminated with bidder revelation bias. Sometimes 
tender offers are announced concurrently with other disclosures and a bid may 
reveal information about the value of the bidder not arising from the combination.  
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 The authors find that valuation improvements are larger than those indicated 
by the conventional method. Consequently, the conventional method indicates that 
bidders overpay, however when applying the Probability Scaling and Intervention 
methods the hypothesis that bidders on average pay fair prices for targets cannot be 
rejected. In addition, analysis indicates that the traditional method may lead to 
incorrect conclusions about economic forces in the M&A market.  
 The previous literature suggests that target firms earn a positive and 
statistically significant CAR, however for the bidder and combined firms, the results 
are inconsistent. The abnormal returns to bidder firms are statistically insignificant 
or negative and statistically significant, and the CARs to the combined firm are 
positive and statistically significant or insignificant. These differences could be the 
result of differing event windows used in the CAR calculation, and/or the time 
periods examined in the analysis. The market distinguishes between the method by 
which a merger is financed with the returns to cash or combination financed mergers 
generating higher abnormal returns than those financed solely by stock for target and 
bidder firms, however DeLong (2001) finds no such relationship for the combined 
firm. When looking at the wealth effects to M&As that are focusing versus 
diversifying, in general, the short-term market reactions do not differ. Furthermore, 
many authors find that the CARs were increasing in the 1990s. 
 This chapter presented an overview of the U.S. banking industry dating back 
to the 1930s and, in particular, the evolution of the banking legislation. The 
literature on bank M&As was reviewed and an overview of the results was 
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presented. Chapter 3 describes the data, selection of the sample, and the 
methodology for the empirical tests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the collection of the data, selection of the sample, and 
methodologies for the event study, independent group t-test and regression analysis. 
The empirical tests examine the short-term shareholder wealth effects of bank 
M&As that were announced and completed from 1989 – 2004. 
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3.1 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
A comprehensive list of 1223 bank and thrift mergers and acquisitions of 
publicly traded firms from 1989 to 2004 was obtained from SNL Financial 
(www.snl.com). This list contained the bidder and target company names, ticker 
symbols, and the announcement and completion dates of the M&As. Next, all firms 
with a three-digit SIC code of 602 (commercial banks) and 671 (bank holding 
companies) were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
tapes. From this sample, all firms with a delist code in the 200’s (merger) were 
obtained. Two samples of firms were gathered, one containing all banking firms and 
the second containing all target firms in the CRSP tapes for the 1988 – 2004 time 
period. The firms in the extracted CRSP tapes were then matched with those in the 
M&A list by ticker symbol and company name. For target firms, the delist dates 
were compared to the completion date of the M&A to ensure that the correct firm 
was being used. This process resulted in the loss of 48 target firms and 269 bidder 
firms.  
The inclusion criteria for the bank M&A sample is that the bidder and target 
firms have at least 100 pre-announcement date return observations available in the 
CRSP tapes. With 100 bidder and 321 target banks not meeting this criteria the 
resulting sample consists of 854 bank M&As covering the 1989 – 2004 time period. 
For these banking firms the following variables were collected: stock price, shares 
outstanding, daily return, method of payment, and state headquarters. 
To determine the state that the banking firm is headquartered, the CompuStat 
database was used. If not covered by CompuStat, an Internet search was conducted 
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to find press releases and/or company websites that included the headquarters of the 
firm in question. With respect to method of payment, delist codes in the CRSP tapes 
are only available up to 2003, thereby limiting the analysis to 795 bank M&As. In 
addition, daily return data for the CRSP equally-weighted index including 
distributions was obtained for the 1988 to 2004 time period. 
Pilloff and Santomero (1997) point out that selection bias is prevalent in 
many studies examining bank M&As. Many researchers exclude M&As when a firm 
engages in multiple M&As in the same year, or over a given time period. It is 
suggested that omission of these M&As results in the most relevant M&As and 
firms not being included in the analysis and will lead to biased results. This sample 
does not exclude banks that engage in multiple M&As and therefore not subject to 
such biases. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
To examine the short-term wealth effects around the announcement of a bank 
merger or acquisition for bidder and target firms, an event study methodology is 
used as defined by Brown and Warner (1985). To compute risk-adjusted (OLS) 
abnormal returns, market model parameters are estimated in the pre-event estimation 
period in the form of: 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++= ~~                  (3.1) 
where itR~  is the return on the stock of firm i at time t and mtR~  being the return on 
the CRSP equally-weighted index including distributions at time t. To calculate the 
risk-adjusted (OLS) returns in the event period the following equation is utilized: 
mtiiitit RRA βα ˆˆ −−=                (3.2) 
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where Ait is the abnormal return for firm i at time t, Rit is the return on the stock of 
firm i at time t, Rmt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted index including 
distributions at time t, and iαˆ  and iβˆ  are the market model parameters estimated 
from the pre-event estimation period for firm i. The cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidder and target firms over the event period is then calculated as the sum of the 
arithmetic means of the cross-sectional abnormal returns over each event period day. 
The CARs are measured using three event windows: 3-day (-1, +1), 11-day 
(-5, +5) and 36-day (-30, +5). These event windows were chosen in order to allow 
comparison to previous studies and to determine whether the results are robust to 
changes in the event window. The 36-day (-30, +5) event window was chosen 
because in calculating the CARs for the target firms, a longer event window may be 
needed to capture run-up that occurred prior to the merger announcement. The event 
study is carried out for the entire 1989 – 2004 sample period, the sub-sample time 
periods 1989 – 1994, 1995 – 1998 and 1999 – 2004, and each individual year. This 
is done to explore whether the return pattern has changed over the sample horizon. 
To compute combined cumulative abnormal returns, the following 
methodology outlined by Houston and Ryngaert (1994) is followed: 
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where Vib is the value of bidder firm i on the first day of the event window and Vit is 
the value of target firm i on the first day of the event window. Value is calculated as 
the market value of the firms equity multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
CARib represents the CAR for bidder firm i over the event window and CARit the 
CAR for target firm i over the event window. 
 23
To calculate the variance of each bidder and target firm’s abnormal return, the 
following equation is utilized: 
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The variance of each merger i's total abnormal return is computed as follows:  
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To gauge the statistical significance of the target, bidder, and combined 
CARs three distinct test statistics are used: traditional standardized (Brown and 
Warner (1985)), standardized cross-sectional (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991)), and mean rank (Corrado (1989)). The traditional and standardized test 
statistics are parametric tests, while the mean rank test statistic is non-parametric. 
The mean rank test statistic is used in the analysis because it is not influenced by the 
presence of outliers, whereas the traditional standardized and standardized cross-
sectional test statistics are.  
The three differing test statistics each have properties that results in it being 
more applicable under certain conditions as outlined by Cowan and Sergeant (1996) 
and Serra (2002). The main issues with respect to this study is the possibility that 
some of the target and bidder firms are thinly traded, and that event induced 
increases in variability of the returns around the event date may also exist. The 
traditional standardized test statistic is poorly specified for thinly traded samples, but 
can be used for actively traded samples where there are no event induced increases 
in variability of the returns. If the variance is unlikely to increase over the event 
window and the sample is thinly traded, the mean rank test is the most powerful and 
offers the best specification. When the return variance increases over the event 
window, the standardized cross-sectional test statistic is the most powerful and 
 25
specified the best, but suffers if the sample is thinly traded. However, if the variance 
does not increase over the event window the standardized cross-sectional test 
statistic runs a high risk of misspecification. Nonetheless, a consistent conclusion 
amongst the test statistics adds credibility to the conclusions drawn in this study. 
The traditional standardized test statistic is computed as follows: 
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The standardized cross-sectional test statistic is computed as follows: 
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The mean rank test statistic is computed as follows: 
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 An independent group t-test is used to test for significance between the 
difference in the mean CARs for two types of mergers or acquisitions. In this case, 
the test is carried out to determine whether there are differences between the target, 
bidder, and combined mean CARs for M&As financed by cash only or a 
combination of cash, stock, and/or debt versus stock only, and also focusing 
(intrastate) versus diversifying (interstate) geographically. The tests are carried out 
for the entire sample period and three sub-sample periods. 
When conducting the independent group t-test, an F-test is used to determine 
whether the variances of the groups are equal or unequal at the 5% level of 
significance. If the variances are deemed equal the pooled t-test is used, and if 
unequal the Satterthwaite t-test is utilized to test for statistical significance and draw 
the appropriate conclusions. The null hypothesis tests for no difference between the 
mean CARs for the two groups of M&As. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is 
concluded that there is a statistical difference between the mean CARs.  
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The F-test test statistic is computed as follows: 
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The pooled t-test test statistic is computed as follows: 
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The Scatterthwaite t-test test statistic is computed as follows: 
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A regression model is used to explore the drivers of the target, bidder, and 
combined CARs and determine whether the short-term capital market reaction to 
bank M&As has changed over the sample period. The dependent variable in the 
regression models are the target, bidder, and combined CARs as measured under the 
3-day (-1, +1), 11-day (-5, +5), and 36-day (-30, +5) event windows.  
The explanatory variables in the regression equation are the target-to-bidder 
ratio, a method of payment dummy variable, a geographic location dummy variable, 
and dummy variables for each year in the sample period. The target-to-bidder ratio 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of the target firm divided by 
the market value of the bidder firm, where market value is computed as the market 
value of the firms equity multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the event window from which the CARs are calculated. The method of 
payment dummy variable is equal to 1 if the M&A is financed by cash only or a 
combination of cash, stock and/or debt, and 0 if financed by stock only. The 
geographic location dummy variable is equal to 1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if 
interstate. 
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The regression model is expressed as follows: 
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 where 
 ln(TBRi)     = the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio 
MPi  = the method of payment dummy variable which equals 1  
if the M&A is financed by cash or a combination of  
cash, stock and/or debt, and 0 if financed by stock only 
GEOGi       = the geographic location dummy variable which equals 1  
if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate 
1990i - 2003i  = the dummy variables indicating the year that the M&A  
was announced 
A standard t-test, regression coefficient divided by its standard error, is used 
to gauge the statistical significance of the regression coefficients with the null 
hypothesis being that the coefficient is equal to zero. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies that the variable has a statistically significant influence on the 
cumulative abnormal return. 
 30
CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 This chapter presents the empirical results of the tests that were carried out 
on the bank M&A sample. The chapter begins with summary statistics on the sample 
(section 4.1). The results of the event study to assess the short-term market reaction 
around the announcement of bank M&As are contained in section 4.2. Sections 4.3 
and 4.4 examine the statistical differences between the mean CARs based on method 
of payment and geographic location, and section 4.4 presents the results of the 
regression analysis. 
 31
4.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the bank M&A sample by year and 
includes the number of M&As, total and mean market values of the M&As, mean 
market values of the target and bidder firms, and the mean target-to-bidder ratio. The 
number of M&As in the sample increased throughout the 1990s and reached its 
highest level in 1998 at 100. The mean value of the M&As is increasing over the 
sample horizon, as are the mean values of the target and bidder banks. The increased 
value of the banks is expected because of deregulation and the mass consolidation 
that ensued. In addition, the relative size of the target to the bidder bank has 
increased over the sample horizon.  
Table 4.1: Bank M&A Sample Summary Statistics 
Year M&As Total value of 
M&As 
Mean 
value of 
M&As  
Mean 
value of 
targets  
Mean 
value of 
bidders 
Mean 
target-to-
bidder ratio 
1989 2 1,057.73 528.86 54.01 474.86 0.1208 
1990 27 33,306.88 1,233.59 169.89 1,063.69 0.2247 
1991 20 35,309.35 1,765.47 234.70 1,765.47 0.2366 
1992 42 125,181.05 2,980.50 355.23 2,625.27 0.1767 
1993 56 162,082.14 2,894.32 181.50 2,712.82 0.1177 
1994 68 181,775.94 2,673.18 200.89 2,472.28 0.1682 
1995 71 220,923.61 3,111.60 465.08 2,646.52 0.3296 
1996 73 360,121.01 4,933.16 629.22 4,303.94 0.2150 
1997 83 362,526.38 4,367.79 607.61 3,760.18 0.2337 
1998 100 710,040.42 7,100.40 1,983.29 5,117.11 0.3666 
1999 66 291,742.67 4,420.34 365.05 4,055.30 0.2120 
2000 70 710,764.53 10,153.78 625.65 10,153.78 0.2708 
2001 57 358,701.14 6,293.00 608.41 5,684.59 0.2388 
2002 33 329,500.56 9,984.87 408.21 9,576.65 0.2865 
2003 35 220,034.21 6,286.69 305.65 5,981.05 0.2013 
2004 51 622,084.59 12,197.74 2,707.66 9,490.08 0.2762 
All 854 4,773,640.44 5,589.74 750.21 4,839.54 0.2445 
This table displays the summary statistics for the sample of 854 U.S. bank M&As that were announced 
and completed from 1989 – 2004. Value is determined by multiplying the stock price times the number 
of shares outstanding on the completion date of the M&A. Values are in U.S.$ millions. 
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4.2 EVENT STUDY 
The following section contains the results of the event study conducted to 
assess the short-term capital market reaction to the 854 U.S. bank M&As. The event 
study is carried out for the overall 1989 – 2004 sample period, for the sub-sample 
periods 1989 – 1994, 1995 – 1998 and 1999 – 2004, and each individual year. 
4.2.1 TARGET CARs 
In tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 the CARs are provided over a 3-day (-1, +1), an 
11-day (-5, +5), and a 36-day (-30, +5) event window for target firms. For the 1989 
– 2004 sample period the CARs are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance under each event window and test statistic. The CAR values 
range from 16.78% to 21.63% for the 3-day (-1, +1) and 36-day (-30, +5) event 
windows respectively. 
Turning attention to the sub-sample periods and individual years, the 
abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant with associated p-values of 
0.00 under each test statistic. Furthermore, it appears that the CARs are increasing in 
the more recent years of the sample period and more specifically, beginning in 1999. 
Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with the prior literature as target banks 
gain significantly around the announcement of a merger or acquisition. 
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Table 4.2: Target CARs: 3-day (-1, +1) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 15.96 18.40 * 22.48 * 5.86 * 
1990 18 27.35 23.09 * 36.94 * 7.87 * 
1991 33 18.15 16.69 * 24.19 * 9.94 * 
1992 51 20.46 20.83 * 30.60 * 11.52 * 
1993 62 17.61 18.30 * 23.26 * 10.80 * 
1994 70 11.61 17.18 * 21.07 * 9.61 * 
1995 73 13.16 24.23 * 32.45 * 14.46 * 
1996 66 12.82 24.15 * 31.53 * 12.15 * 
1997 96 12.56 28.53 * 38.82 * 16.54 * 
1998 75 11.83 23.23 * 29.51 * 12.60 * 
1999 74 18.30 27.29 * 39.26 * 14.92 * 
2000 61 21.68 29.17 * 43.58 * 14.46 * 
2001 49 27.22 38.49 * 45.38 * 12.98 * 
2002 31 25.98 38.88 * 48.70 * 10.95 * 
2003 47 18.16 40.91 * 44.21 * 12.55 * 
2004 23 14.42 26.13 * 25.95 * 10.30 * 
1989 – 1994 259 17.12 39.40 * 61.21 * 22.84 * 
1995 – 1998 310 12.59 44.84 * 66.41 * 28.02 * 
1999 – 2004 285 21.05 63.02 * 100.38 * 31.32 * 
1989 – 2004 854 16.78 68.66 * 131.74 * 47.55 * 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for target firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Target CARs: 11-day (-5, +5) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 15.60 9.31 * 11.74 * 10.49 * 
1990 18 26.08 11.51 * 18.65 * 13.89 * 
1991 33 21.00 10.33 * 13.90 * 20.56 * 
1992 51 23.86 13.04 * 19.15 *  24.11 * 
1993 62 18.33 9.95 * 13.83 * 17.50 * 
1994 70 11.65 9.30 * 10.64 * 14.09 * 
1995 73 14.29 13.73 * 19.39 * 23.81 * 
1996 66 14.23 14.85 * 17.49 * 22.38 * 
1997 96 13.42 16.58 * 22.30 * 29.44 * 
1998 75 13.48 14.65 * 17.66 * 24.28 * 
1999 74 20.56 16.79 * 22.56 * 27.84 * 
2000 61 26.29 19.31 * 27. 33 * 32.92 * 
2001 49 28.15 20.81 * 24.66 * 23.12 * 
2002 31 26.01 20.38 * 25.36 * 14.72 * 
2003 47 18.90 22.65 * 24.16 * 19.20 * 
2004 23 16.36 15.93 * 16.05 * 17.59 * 
1989 – 1994 259 18.21 22.88 * 34.32 * 40.86 * 
1995 – 1998 310 13.82 29.19 * 38.57 * 50.20 * 
1999 – 2004 285 23.07 38.74 * 57.10 * 56.62 * 
1989 – 2004 854 18.23 45.42 * 75.12 * 85.45 * 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for target firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Target CARs: 36-day (-30, +5) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 19.79 6.83 * 9.28 * 57.44 * 
1990 18 22.22 5.79 * 10.27 * 42.46 * 
1991 33 28.96 7.65 * 11.19 * 75.72 * 
1992 51 25.18 7.38 * 12.05 * 85.69 * 
1993 62 20.05 6.02 * 8.00 * 76.36 * 
1994 70 16.81 7.18 * 8.76 * 92.62 * 
1995 73 17.01 9.45 * 12.08 * 96.64 * 
1996 66 17.88 10.64 * 12.20 * 94.75 * 
1997 96 18.19 13.26 * 17.05 * 119.24 * 
1998 75 15.09 8.67 * 10.38 * 95.12 * 
1999 74 26.42 12.54 * 15.59 * 103.51 * 
2000 61 32.68 14.03 * 18.78 * 104.02 * 
2001 49 29.98 11.99 * 14.29 * 82.24 * 
2002 31 28.23 12.24 * 14.35 * 63.48 * 
2003 47 20.32 13.09 * 14.02 * 73.99 * 
2004 23 16.29 8.57 * 8.65 * 51.00 * 
1989 – 1994 259 21.43 14.84 * 23.40 * 179.74 * 
1995 – 1998 310 17.10 22.41 * 26.09 * 203.73 * 
1999 – 2004 285 26.74 26.86 * 35.44 * 200.32 * 
1989 – 2004 854 21.63 34.44 * 49.08 * 337.45 * 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for target firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.2.2 BIDDER CARs  
 The results of the event study under the 3-day (-1, +1), 11-day (-5, +5), and 
36-day (-30, +5) event windows for bidder firms are displayed in tables 4.5, 4.6, and 
4.7. For the full 1989 – 2004 sample period, the CARs to bidder firms are negative 
and statistically significant under each event window and test statistic. The CAR 
values are –1.42%, -1.65%, and –2.00% with associated p-value’s of 0.00 under the 
3-day, 11-day, and 36-day event windows.  
The sub-sample time periods also exhibit negative and statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns. When looking at the individual years the 
CARs are generally negative, but the conclusions drawn depend on the test statistic 
that one considers.  
These results are consistent with the previous literature as the abnormal 
returns to bidder firms are negative and statistically significant. However, comparing 
these results to those of Becher (2000) shows a discrepancy under the 11-day event 
window. This study shows a negative and statistically significant CAR, while 
Becher (2000) shows an insignificant CAR. The difference may be the result of this 
study utilizing a larger sample and more recent sample period. Nonetheless, the 
results indicate that bidder firms experience a loss in short-term shareholder wealth 
around the announcement of an M&A. 
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Table 4.5: Bidder CARs: 3-day (-1, +1) event window 
Year Number of 
M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -1.60 -3.32 * -4.59 * -3.15 * 
1990 18 -2.33 -3.01 * -2.19 ** -0.70 
1991 33 -0.36 -0.55  -0.79  -1.09 
1992 51 -1.89 -3.68 * -4.36 * -5.19 * 
1993 62 -1.40 -1.39  -4.37 * -4.59 * 
1994 70 -1.46 -4.69 * -4.44 * -5.15 * 
1995 73 -1.12 -3.36 * -3.89 * -3.82 * 
1996 66 -0.53 -1.61  -2.16 ** 0.38 
1997 96 -1.26 -4.20 * -4.90 * -3.88 * 
1998 75 -1.93 -4.65 *  -5.71 * -6.10 * 
1999 74 -2.98 -5.92 * -6.94 * -6.14 * 
2000 61 -1.31 -2.18 ** -2.49 ** -2.55 ** 
2001 49 -1.22 -2.14 ** -2.45 ** -3.36 * 
2002 31 -0.59 -1.10 -1.18  -0.87  
2003 47 -0.91 -2.68 * -3.66 * -3.75 * 
2004 23 -1.36 -2.89 * -2.31 ** -0.96 
1989 – 1994 259 -1.47 -4.70 * -8.67 * -8.87 * 
1995 – 1998 310 -1.23 -7.56 * -8.42 * -6.83 * 
1999 – 2004 285 -1.59 -7.45 * -8.24 * -7.78 * 
1989 – 2004 854 -1.42 -10.82 * -14.60 * -13.45* 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidder firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Bidder CARs: 11-day (-5, +5) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -2.42 -2.54 ** -3.26 * -1.36  
1990 18 -1.20 -0.83 -1.12 3.99 * 
1991 33 0.56 0.44 0.41 6.86 * 
1992 51 -1.49 -1.51 -2.04 ** 2.35 ** 
1993 62 -2.83 -1.46 -3.57 -1.26 
1994 70 -2.21 -3.70 * -3.56 -1.19 
1995 73 -1.00 -1.56 -1.80 ** 4.51 * 
1996 66 0.03 0.05  0.24 11.63 * 
1997 96 -1.11 -1.94 *** -2.37 ** 7.26 * 
1998 75 -4.02 -5.12 * -6.07 * -8.98 * 
1999 74 -3.90 -4.08 * -4.78 * -0.91  
2000 61 -0.31 -0.27 0.16 9.06 * 
2001 49 -0.44 -0.40 -0.54 6.95 * 
2002 31 -1.85 -1.83 *** -1.95 * 0.03 
2003 47 -1.24 -1.88 *** -2.19 * 0.88 
2004 23 -0.68 -0.75 -0.67 6.25 * 
1989 – 1994 259 -1.81 -3.02 * -5.66 * 2.91 * 
1995 – 1998 310 -1.54 -4.86 * -5.07 * 7.21 * 
1999 – 2004 285 -1.61 -4.00 * -4.30 * 8.74 * 
1989 – 2004 854 -1.65 -6.58 * -8.66 * 10.99 * 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidder firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Bidder CARs: 36-day (-30, +5) event window 
Year Number of 
M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -2.02 -1.15  -1.90 *** 35.74 * 
1990 18 -3.08 -1.17 -1.15 37.20 * 
1991 33 -0.94 -0.40 -0.41 49.58 * 
1992 51 -2.76 -1.50 -1.86 *** 58.08 * 
1993 62 -4.61 -1.31 -2.21 ** 63.78 * 
1994 70 -1.57 -1.30 -1.34 70.47 * 
1995 73 -0.66 -0.56 -0.65 76.17 * 
1996 66 -0.31 -0.27 0.21 77.60 * 
1997 96 0.97 0.93 0.86 95.15 * 
1998 75 -6.04 -4.19 * -4.72 * 56.53 * 
1999 74 -6.93 -4.01 * -4.69 * 54.74 * 
2000 61 2.03 0.96 0.96 75.21 * 
2001 49 -2.99 -1.49 -1.71 *** 54.34 * 
2002 31 -2.67 -1.51 -1.63 41.27 * 
2003 47 -0.50 -0.40 0.30 65.85 * 
2004 23 1.51 0.92 1.32 54.13 * 
1989 – 1994 259 -2.60 -2.35 ** -3.64 * 132.25 * 
1995 – 1998 310 -1.39 -2.36 ** -2.06 ** 153.55 * 
1999 – 2004 285 -2.13 -2.81 * -2.70 * 140.93 * 
1989 – 2004 854 -2.00 -4.28 * -4.80 246.75 * 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidder firms around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.2.3 COMBINED CARs 
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 display the results of the event study for the 
combined firm under the 3-day (-1, +1), 11-day (-5, +5), and 36-day (-30, +5) event 
windows. For the 1989 – 2004 sample period, the CARs are positive and statistically 
significant with the exception being under the 36-day event window and when 
considering the traditional test statistic. The CAR values range from 0.45% under 
the 36-day event window to 0.70% under the 3-day event window.  
The CARs appear to be increasing over the sub-sample time periods and 
individual years with the highest returns being in 2000 and 2001 and the 1999 – 
2004 sub-sample time period. Furthermore, for the 1995 – 1998 and 1999 – 2004 
time periods the CARs are positive and statistically significant under the 
standardized and mean rank test statistics. The overall results indicate that the 
combined firm experiences a positive revaluation around the announcement of a 
merger or acquisition and implies a transfer of wealth from the bidder to the target 
firms. This result is consistent with prior work by Becher (2000), Anderson, Becher, 
and Campbell II (2004) and Delong and DeYoung (2004). 
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Table 4.8:  Combined CARs: 3-day (-1, +1) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -0.23 -0.53  -1.06 0.90  
1990 18 0.53 0.74 2.18 ** 3.41 * 
1991 33 1.78 3.16 * 5.19 * 1.89 ** 
1992 51 -0.21 -0.46 -1.22  0.83  
1993 62 -0.08 -0.22 -1.98 ** 1.44 
1994 70 -0.38 -1.29 -1.98 ** -0.15 
1995 73 0.74 2.51 ** 5.64 * 2.75 * 
1996 66 1.24 4.31 * 7.91 * 7.55 * 
1997 96 0.82 3.00 * 5.51* 5.69 * 
1998 75 0.29 0.82 1.27  0.24 
1999 74 -0.55 -1.20 -1.97  0.87 
2000 61 2.19 4.16 * 11.80 * 5.83 * 
2001 49 2.40 4.61 * 10.24 * 4.48 * 
2002 31 1.08 2.20 ** 3.75 * 2.87 * 
2003 47 1.47 5.17 * 7.33 * 2.94 * 
2004 23 1.14 2.81 * 5.99 * 5.91 * 
1989 – 1994 259 0.08 0.45 -0.44 2.85 * 
1995 – 1998 310 0.76 5.17 * 10.08 * 8.10 * 
1999 – 2004 285 1.19 6.23 * 14.28 * 8.81 * 
1989 – 2004 854 0.70 7.10 * 14.08 * 11.54 * 
This table displays the combined cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date 
of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4.9: Combined CARs: 11-day (-5, +5) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -1.09 -1.28 -4.38 * 3.16 * 
1990 18 0.70 0.52 0.35 6.24 * 
1991 33 2.79 2.57 ** 8.52 * 10.69 * 
1992 51 0.42 0.48 1.00 9.33 * 
1993 62 -1.33 1.81 *** 5.69 * 5.96 * 
1994 70 -1.08 -1.87 *** -6.15 * 2.93 * 
1995 73 0.84 1.47 6.21 * 11.21 * 
1996 66 1.90 3.49 * 13.00 * 19.21 * 
1997 96 1.00 1.93 *** 6.98 * 17.28 * 
1998 75 -1.38 -2.05 ** -8.07 * -0.54 
1999 74 -1.27 -1.44 -4.71 * 8.52 * 
2000 61 3.56 3.50 * 17.64 * 19.44 * 
2001 49 2.93 2.86 * 11.73 * 14.28 * 
2002 31 -0.12 -0.12 -1.02 3.44 * 
2003 47 1.12 2.04 ** 6.23 *  7.26 *  
2004 23 1.90 2.43 ** 9.20 * 13.85 * 
1989 – 1994 259 -0.23 -0.67  -3.77 * 15.03 * 
1995 – 1998 310 0.58 2.03 ** 8.14 * 23.66 * 
1999 – 2004 285 1.26 3.45 * 15.43 * 27.27 * 
1989 – 2004 854 0.56 2.97 * 12.22 * 38.29 * 
This table displays the combined cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date 
of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Combined CARs: 36-day (-30, +5) event window 
Year Number 
of M&As 
CARs (%) Traditional 
t-statistic 
Standardized 
t-statistic 
Mean rank  
t-statistic 
1989  25 -0.56 -0.36 -2.89 * 43.18 * 
1990 18 -1.62 -0.66 -4.43 * 36.95 * 
1991 33 1.59 0.78 5.48 * 54.19 * 
1992 51 -0.83 -0.51 -3.60 * 64.43 * 
1993 62 -3.10 -2.37 ** -8.34 * 68.02 * 
1994 70 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 78.68 * 
1995 73 1.36 1.28 9.44 * 86.01 * 
1996 66 1.72 1.78 *** 14.54 * 85.24 * 
1997 96 3.45 3.76 * 24.88 * 106.20 * 
1998 75 3.19 2.59 ** 16.23 * 69.38 * 
1999 74 -3.70 -2.42 ** -14.65 * 67.43 * 
2000 61 6.26 3.33 * 25.15 * 85.67 * 
2001 49 0.55 0.30 2.97 * 64.27 * 
2002 31 -0.46 -0.28 -2.99 * 45.51 * 
2003 47 2.12 1.99 ** 16.39 * 72.24 * 
2004 23 3.99 2.84 * 18.68 * 60.92 * 
1989 – 1994 259 -0.90 -1.35  -5.83 * 145.29 * 
1995 – 1998 310 0.98 1.91 *** 17.15 * 174.26 * 
1999 – 2004 285 1.10 1.62  16.38 * 161.83 * 
1989 – 2004 854 0.45 1.28 16.58 * 278.48 * 
This table displays the combined cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date 
of a bank merger or acquisition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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4.2.4 SUMMARY 
Table 4.11 displays the testable hypotheses and the expected effects for bank 
M&As as described in section 1.1 Motivation and Objectives. Overall, the results 
indicate that target firms realize significant short-term gains, bidder firms realize a 
negative and statistically significant return, and the combined firm experiences a 
statistically significant and positive CAR around the announcement of a merger or 
acquisition. In addition, it appears that the CARs to the target firms are increasing in 
the 1999 - 2004 sub-sample time period and will be explored in section 4.5 
Regression Analysis.  
The overall results are consistent with the hubris and synergy hypothesis. 
Under the hypothesis bank M&As are wealth-creating event’s as synergies exist; 
however, bidder firms overpay to realize these gains as they may overestimate their 
ability to create value once they gain control of the target firm’s assets. 
Table 4.11: Event Study Hypotheses 
 Hubris hypothesis Synergy hypothesis Hubris and synergy 
hypothesis 
Target Positive Positive Positive 
Bidder Negative Insignificant Negative 
Combined Insignificant Positive Positive 
This table presents a summary of the testable hypotheses and the expected results with respect to the 
target, bidder and combined CARs.  
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4.3 METHOD OF PAYMENT 
 The prior literature suggests that the abnormal returns to the target, bidder, 
and combined firms may be affected by the choice of payment method used to 
finance the M&A. Therefore, this analysis is important in order to determine 
whether the short-term capital market reaction to M&As differs based on the method 
of payment. The analysis is carried out for the overall 1989 – 2003 time period, as 
well as for 1989 – 1994, 1995 – 1998, and 1999 – 2003 sub-sample time periods. 
4.3.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Table 4.12 displays the number and percentage of the M&As that are 
financed by only cash or a combination of cash, stock and/or debt (cash + mix), and 
stock only. It can be seen that stock has been the most prominent financing method 
for M&As in the sample. For the 1989 – 2003 sample period 73.33% of the M&As 
are financed solely through stock. However, it should be pointed out that the 
percentage of M&As in the sample financed by cash + mix increases from 20.13% 
in the 1995 – 1998 time period to 36.09% in the 1999 – 2003 time period.  
Table 4.12: Bank Sample M&As by Method of Payment 
Time Period Cash + Mix Stock Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) 
1989 – 1994 67 190 26.07% 73.93% 
1995 – 1998 62 246 20.13% 79.87% 
1999 – 2003 83 147 36.09% 63.91% 
1989 – 2003 212 583 26.67% 73.33% 
This table presents the number and percentage of M&As by method of payment. Cash + Mix is defined 
as a payment consisting of cash only, or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt. Stock indicates that 
the M&A was financed by stock only.  
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4.3.2 TARGET FIRMS 
 
 Table 4.13 displays the results of the independent group t-test with respect to 
method of payment for target firms. The results under panels A, B, and C display a 
consistent result as the CARs to target firms are statistically greater for cash + mix 
financed M&As than those that are financed via stock for the 1989 – 2003 sample 
period. Turning attention to the sub-sample periods, it can be seen that the market 
does not distinguish between the payment options as reflected by the insignificance 
between the mean CARs for the 1989 – 1994 and 1995 – 1998 time periods, but 
rewards those M&As that are financed by cash or a combination payment for the 
1999 – 2003 time period.  
Therefore, the overall results may be driven by the most recent sub-sample 
time period where the previously shown statistics illustrated that the use of cash or 
combination payments for M&As increased in this time frame. The insignificant 
differences in the early sub-sample periods is not surprising as Becher (2000) finds 
that for the 1991 – 1997 time period there is no difference in the short-term capital 
market reactions.  
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Table 4.13: Statistical Difference in Target Mean CARs between Payment 
Methods 
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel A: Target CARs –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 20.44% 16.08% 0.12 
1995 – 1998 12.23% 12.64% 0.64 
1999 – 2003 27.37% 19.78% 0.01 ** 
1989 – 2003 20.73% 15.56% 0.00 * 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel B: Target CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 20.32% 17.69% 0.44 
1995 – 1998 13.35% 13.87% 0.80 
1999 – 2003 28.68% 22.58% 0.04 ** 
1989 – 2003 21.53% 17.31% 0.01 ** 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel C: Target CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 22.20% 21.41% 0.95 
1995 – 1998 15.98% 17.30% 0.60 
1999 – 2003 32.83% 27.02% 0.06 *** 
1989 – 2003 24.52% 21.09% 0.07 *** 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by method of payment around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by method of payment.  
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4.3.3 BIDDER FIRMS 
 As displayed in table 4.14, the abnormal returns to bidder firms are affected 
by the choice of cash or a combination payment versus stock to finance the M&A. 
For the full 1989 – 2003 sample period the CARs to the bidder firms are 
significantly greater when the M&A is financed by cash + mix compared to stock. 
When looking at the sub-sample time periods, analysis indicates that the market 
rewards cash + mix financed M&As in the 1999 – 2003 time period compared to 
those that are financed by stock.  
As noted in the previous analysis for target firms, the difference in the CARs 
for the 1999 – 2003 time period may be attributed to the increase in the use of cash 
or a combination payment to finance the M&As and the increased valuations they 
receive. For the 1989 – 1994 and 1995 – 1998 time periods, the results are not robust 
to changes in the event window, but the results illustrated in panels A and B do 
show a greater CAR for cash + mix financed M&As. The results are consistent with 
Becher (2000) as it is found that the market distinguishes between the payment 
options for bidder firms and rewards those M&As financed by cash or a combination 
payment compared to those financed by stock. 
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Table 4.14: Statistical Difference in Bidder Mean CARs between Payment 
Methods 
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel A: Bidder CARs –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -0.77% -1.80% 0.05 ** 
1995 – 1998 -0.35% -1.43% 0.06 *** 
1999 – 2003 -0.21% -2.60% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 -0.43% -1.85% 0.00 * 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel B: Bidder CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -1.36% -2.05% 0.37 
1995 – 1998 -0.51% -1.77% 0.07 *** 
1999 – 2003 0.33% -3.10% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 -0.45% -2.20% 0.00 * 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel C: Bidder CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -1.11% -3.21% 0.14 
1995 – 1998 -1.91% -1.17% 0.52 
1999 – 2003 1.38% -5.33% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 -0.37% -2.89% 0.01 * 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by method of payment around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by method of payment. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.3.4 COMBINED 
The combined CARs are statistically greater for those M&As financed by a 
cash or combination payment compared to those that are financed by stock for the 
1989 – 2003 time period as displayed in table 4.15. For the 1989 – 1994 and 1995 – 
1998 sub-sample periods, the market does not distinguish between M&As that are 
financed via cash or combination payment versus stock. However, the capital 
markets reward those M&As that are financed by cash + mix in the 1999 – 2003 
time period.  
Furthermore, the CARs to M&As financed by a cash or combination 
payment appear to be increasing significantly in the 1999 – 2003 compared to the 
1994 – 1998 time period. For example, under Panel C the CARs to the combined 
firm for the cash + mix payment option are 5.70%, while in the 1994 – 1998 time 
period they are 0.41%. Overall, the results indicate that the capital markets reward, 
in the short-term, those M&As that are financed by cash or a combination payment 
when analyzed for the combined firm. 
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Table 4.15: Statistical Difference in Combined Mean CARs between Payment 
Methods 
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel A: Combined CARs –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 0.43% -0.12% 0.24 
1995 – 1998 1.27% 0.63% 0.27 
1999 – 2003 3.82% -0.31% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 2.00% 0.15% 0.00 * 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel B: Combined CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 0.00% -0.37% 0.63 
1995 – 1998 1.20% 0.42% 0.29 
1999 – 2003 4.34% -0.59% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 2.05% -0.09% 0.00 * 
    
Time period Cash + Mix (%) Stock (%) p-value of t-test: Cash 
+ Mix vs. Stock 
Panel C: Combined CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement 
date 
1989 – 1994 0.23% -1.38% 0.23 
1995 – 1998 0.41% 1.17% 0.50 
1999 – 2003 5.70% -2.39% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2003 2.44% -0.56% 0.00 * 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by method of payment around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by method of payment. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.3.5 SUMMARY 
 The results indicate that M&As financed by only cash or a combination of 
cash, stock and/or debt yield higher cumulative abnormal returns than those that are 
financed by only stock when measured for the target, bidder, and combined firm. 
Furthermore, only the abnormal returns to the target and combined firms in the 1999 
– 2003 time period for M&As financed by a cash or combination payment are 
greater than those that are stock financed. So it appears that the overall results for 
these firms are driven by the most recent sub-sample period. For the 1989 – 1994 
and 1995 – 1998 sub-sample time periods the conclusions drawn regarding bidder 
firms are not robust to changes in the event window. However, under each panel 
presented the mean CARs to bidder firms are greater for cash + mix financed M&As 
in the 1999 – 2003 sub-sample period, as well as the overall sample horizon. 
The change in the pattern of the CARs and the statistical difference in the 
1999 – 2003 time period raise the question as to why this is occurring. One plausible 
explanation is that put forth by Fishman (1989), he suggests that cash payment is 
preferred to stock when there is competition for the target firm. The use of cash 
signals high valuation and deters possible or existing competitors. This is reasonable 
because the IBBEA increased the pool of potential M&As and one would expect that 
competition to acquire the potential target firms increased. In addition, accounting 
scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, may be the reason for the higher mean 
CARs to cash or combination financed M&As as it is reasonable to believe that 
these events resulted in investors being wary of the stock valuations and hence, 
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higher mean CARs to M&As financed by a cash or combination payment compared 
to a stock payment. 
4.4 GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
 
 There exists the possibility that the abnormal returns to the target, bidder and 
combined firm are affected by whether the merger is geographically focusing 
(intrastate) versus geographically diversifying (interstate). Therefore, this analysis 
based on geographic location will test to see whether the capital markets 
differentiate between the focusing and diversifying M&A strategies as reflected by 
their short-term wealth effects. The analysis is carried out for the overall 1989 – 
2004 time period, as well as for the 1989 – 1994, 1995 – 1998, and 1999 – 2004 
sub-sample time periods. This allows one to directly explore the impact of the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 on 
the cumulative abnormal returns to the target, bidder, and combined firms. 
4.4.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Table 4.16 displays the summary statistics for the bank merger sample based 
on geographic location. For the overall 1989 – 2004 time period 49.30% of the 
mergers are geographically focusing (intrastate) whereas 50.70% of the mergers are 
geographically diversifying (interstate). Comparing the three time periods, it can be 
seen that the number of intrastate mergers has increased above that of interstate 
M&As in the 1999 – 2004 time period. In summary, the number of interstate versus 
intrastate mergers are nearly the same throughout the sample period and therefore 
for this sample, the IBBEA legislation has not changed the pattern of the M&A 
activity as branching restrictions were relaxed. 
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Table 4.16: Bank Sample M&As by Geographic Location 
Time Period Intrastate Interstate Intrastate (%) Interstate (%) 
1989 – 1994 126 133 48.65% 51.35% 
1995 – 1998 145 165 46.77% 53.23% 
1999 – 2004 150 135 52.63% 47.37% 
1989 – 2004 421 433 49.30% 50.70% 
This table presents the number and percentage of M&As by geographic location. Intrastate is defined as 
those M&As where the bidder and target firms are headquartered in the same state. Interstate indicates 
that the bidder firm is not headquartered in the same state as the target firm. 
 
4.4.2 TARGET FIRMS 
Table 4.17 displays the results of the independent group t-test based on 
whether the merger is geographically focusing (intrastate) versus geographically 
diversifying (interstate) for target firms in the bank merger sample. The results under 
each panel for the 1989 – 2004 time period show no statistical difference in the 
mean CARs to focusing versus diversifying M&As with the returns ranging from 
16.07% to 21.08% for interstate and 17.51% to 22.19% for intrastate M&As. For 
each sub-sample time period, the abnormal returns to geographically focusing and 
diversifying M&As are statistically equal and are robust to changes in the event 
window. The findings imply that the markets do not distinguish between intrastate 
and interstate M&As for target firms in the short-term. 
It appears that the CARs to target firms for both types of M&As are 
increasing in the 1999 – 2004 time period. For example, under Panel C the abnormal 
returns to interstate and intrastate M&As are 24.94% and 28.35% respectively for 
the 1999 – 2004 time period, whereas in the 1994 – 1998 time period the abnormal 
returns are 16.33% for interstate and 17.99% for intrastate M&As.  
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Table 4.17: Statistical Difference in Target Mean CARs between Intrastate and 
Interstate M&As 
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel A: Target CARs – 1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 18.43% 15.73% 0.24 
1995 – 1998 11.43% 13.91% 0.10 
1999 – 2004 19.49% 22.44% 0.21 
1989 – 2004 16.07% 17.51% 0.19 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel B: Target CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 19.90% 16.42% 0.16 
1995 – 1998 12.54% 15.28% 0.12 
1999 – 2004 22.11% 23.91% 0.43 
1989 – 2004 17.77% 18.71% 0.44 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel C: Target CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 23.09% 19.67% 0.24 
1995 – 1998 16.33% 17.99% 0.42 
1999 – 2004 24.94% 28.35% 0.19 
1989 – 2004 21.08% 22.19% 0.43 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by geographic location around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by geographic location. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.4.3 BIDDER FIRMS 
 Table 4.18 illustrates the results of the study based on geographic location 
for bidder firms in the bank M&A sample. The results indicate that the mean 
abnormal returns to bidder firms are statistically equal for the 1989 – 2004 time 
period, and each sub-sample time period. For the 1989 – 2004 sample period the p-
value of the differences range from 0.32 to 0.87. Furthermore, the results are robust 
to changes in the event window used to calculate the CARs.  
As was the case with the target firms, the short-term market reactions to 
geographically focusing and diversifying M&As are not different. This can be 
interpreted as the capital markets not foreseeing any substantial benefits or otherwise 
to one type over the other as reflected by the mean CARs to bidder firms around the 
announcement of an interstate or intrastate M&A. 
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Table 4.18: Statistical Difference in Bidder Mean CARs between Intrastate and 
Interstate M&As 
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel A: Bidder CARs –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -1.05% -1.90% 0.11 
1995 – 1998 -1.33% -1.12% 0.64 
1999 – 2004 -1.42% -1.74% 0.59 
1989 – 2004 -1.27% -1.57% 0.32 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel B: Bidder CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -1.31% -2.34% 0.13 
1995 – 1998 -2.00% -1.03% 0.12 
1999 – 2004 -1.66% -1.57% 0.92 
1989 – 2004 -1.68% -1.61% 0.87 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel C: Bidder CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 -1.66% -3.59% 0.20 
1995 – 1998 -1.60% -1.13% 0.66 
1999 – 2004 -3.34% -1.04% 0.15 
1989 – 2004 -2.16% -1.84% 0.68 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by geographic location around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by geographic location. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.4.4 COMBINED 
The results of the independent group t-test for the combined firms in the 
bank M&A sample are illustrated in table 4.19.  The combined mean CARs are 
statistically greater for intrastate M&As compared to those of interstate M&As for 
the 1989 – 2004 time period. However, there is no statistical difference in the returns 
for the 1989 – 1994 and 1995 – 1998 time periods, with the exception being under 
panel B for the 1995 – 1998 time period. Therefore, the statistical differences appear 
to be driven by the 1999 – 2004 time period where M&As are rewarded by the 
capital markets for focusing geographically. For example, the CAR values for the 
1999 – 2004 time period range from –1.63% to 0.12% for interstate and from 2.15% 
to 3.55% for intrastate M&As and the accompanying p-values of the difference in 
the mean CARs are 0.00.  
The finding that the capital markets reward intrastate M&As when analyzed 
for the combined firm is inconsistent with DeLong (2001). The differing results 
could be the result of the methodology used as the results presented above are based 
on a group t-test while DeLong (2001) uses a regression framework. This will be 
studied further in section 4.5 Regression Analysis. 
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Table 4.19: Statistical Difference in Combined Mean CARs between Intrastate 
and Interstate M&As  
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel A: Combined CARs –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 0.22% -0.07% 0.56 
1995 – 1998 0.53% 1.02% 0.29 
1999 – 2004 0.12% 2.15% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2004 0.31% 1.10% 0.01 ** 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel B: Combined CARs –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
1989 – 1994 0.00% -0.47% 0.53 
1995 – 1998 -0.06% 1.30% 0.02 ** 
1999 – 2004 0.04% 2.37% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2004 -0.01% 1.15% 0.01 * 
    
Time period Interstate (%) Intrastate (%) p-value of t-test: 
Interstate vs. 
Intrastate 
Panel C: Combined CARs –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement 
date 
1989 – 1994 -0.24% -1.57% 0.36 
1995 – 1998 0.56% 1.46% 0.38 
1999 – 2004 -1.63% 3.55% 0.00 * 
1989 – 2004 -0.37% 1.29% 0.03 ** 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by geographic location around the 
announcement date of a bank merger or acquisition. The table also provides the results of the 
independent group t-test to compare the mean CARs by geographic location. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.4.5 SUMMARY 
 The results indicate that the capital markets do not distinguish between 
geographically focusing and diversifying M&As when the CARs are measured for 
the target and bidder firms. However, when measuring the abnormal returns for the 
combined firm over the full sample period, it is found that the markets reward those 
M&As that are geographically focusing in the short-term. However, the results 
appear to be driven by the 1999 – 2004 sub-sample period as this is the only sub-
sample period where the market distinguishes between intrastate and interstate 
M&As. Finally, the IBBEA has not had much of an effect on the number of 
intrastate compared to interstate M&As as branching restrictions were relaxed. 
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4.5 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 The following regression analysis is used to explore the drivers of the 
cumulative abnormal returns to the target, bidder, and combined firms and determine 
whether the market reaction has changed over the 1989 – 2003 sample period. The 
CARs under a 3-day (-1, +1), 11-day (-5, +5) and 36-day (-30, +5) event window are 
regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if the merger is financed by cash only or a combination 
of cash, stock and/or debt and 0 if stock only), a geographic dummy variable (1 if 
the merger is intrastate and 0 if interstate), as well as dummy variables for each year 
in the sample. 
4.5.1 TARGET FIRMS 
 The results of the regression analysis for target firms are contained in tables 
4.20, 4.21 and 4.22. The coefficient on the target-to-bidder ratio is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level under each event window utilized in 
computing the CARs to the target firms. This indicates that the smaller is the size of 
the target firm to the bidder firm, the greater the CAR to the target firm.  
The method of payment dummy variable is positive and significant at the 
10% level in table 4.20, however insignificant in tables 4.21 and 4.22. Although 
sensitive to the event window used in computing the CARs, the conclusion that there 
is no difference between the short-term market reactions to cash versus stock 
financed M&As for the full sample period is expected. In section 4.3.1 the overall 
results appear to be driven by the 1999 – 2003 sub-sample time period and the 
evidence provided here supports this notion.  
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The results of the independent group t-test indicated no difference in the 
mean CARs to intrastate and interstate M&As for target firms. However, the 
coefficient on the geographic dummy variable is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level as seen in tables 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22. This implies that the capital 
markets react more favorably to target firms involved in intrastate M&As in the 
short-term as compared to those involved in interstate M&As. 
Previous analysis indicated that the CARs to the target firms were higher in 
the latter years of the sample period and this notion is confirmed by the results of the 
regression. In tables 4.21 and 4.22 the 1992 (5% level), 2000 (1% level), 2001 (1% 
level, 1% in table 4.20), 2002 (10% level) and 2003 (10% level, insignificant in 
table 4.20) dummy variables are positive and statistically significant. The higher 
CARs in the latter years could be the result of the increased use of and favorable 
reactions to cash or combination payments in the 1999 – 2003 time period. 
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Table 4.20: Target CAR Regression: 3-Day (-1, +1) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.4750 7.63 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.4133 -6.37 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0256 1.79 *** 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0292 2.35 ** 
1990 dummy variable 0.0730 1.39 
1991 dummy variable 0.0338 0.76 
1992 dummy variable 0.0527 1.29 
1993 dummy variable 0.0018 0.04 
1994 dummy variable -0.0579 -1.48 
1995 dummy variable -0.0296 -0.76 
1996 dummy variable -0.0328 -0.84 
1997 dummy variable -0.0225 -0.60 
1998 dummy variable -0.0238 -0.61 
1999 dummy variable 0.0266 0.69 
2000 dummy variable 0.0639 1.61 
2001 dummy variable 0.1185 2.89 * 
2002 dummy variable 0.0765 1.70 *** 
2003 dummy variable 0.0763 1.40 
Adjusted R2 11.41%  
F-statistic 6.98 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
target firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.21: Target CAR Regression: 11-Day (-5, +5) Event Window  
Dependent variable: CAR –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.5283 8.12 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.4784 -7.06 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0162 1.08 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0290 2.22 ** 
1990 dummy variable 0.0753 1.38 
1991 dummy variable 0.0635 1.36 
1992 dummy variable 0.0874 2.03 ** 
1993 dummy variable 0.0111 0.27 
1994 dummy variable -0.0588 -1.43 
1995 dummy variable -0.0087 -0.21 
1996 dummy variable -0.0168 -0.41 
1997 dummy variable -0.0126 -0.32 
1998 dummy variable -0.0055 -0.13 
1999 dummy variable 0.0494 1.21 
2000 dummy variable 0.1133 2.72 * 
2001 dummy variable 0.1330 3.08 * 
2002 dummy variable 0.0796 1.68 *** 
2003 dummy variable 0.0971 1.69 *** 
Adjusted R2 12.45%  
F-statistic 7.64 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
target firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.22: Target CAR Regression: 36-Day (-30, +5) Event Window  
Dependent variable: CAR –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.5064 7.82 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.4505 -6.67 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0165 1.09 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0278 2.13 ** 
1990 dummy variable 0.0693 1.27  
1991 dummy variable 0.0648 1.38 
1992 dummy variable 0.0868 2.01 ** 
1993 dummy variable 0.0097 0.23 
1994 dummy variable -0.0564 -1.37 
1995 dummy variable -0.0092 0.22 
1996 dummy variable -0.0160 -0.39 
1997 dummy variable -0.0105 -0.26 
1998 dummy variable -0.0068 -0.17 
1999 dummy variable 0.0494 1.21 
2000 dummy variable 0.1185 2.84 * 
2001 dummy variable 0.1324 3.06 * 
2002 dummy variable 0.0839 1.77 *** 
2003 dummy variable 0.1031 1.79 *** 
Adjusted R2 12.00%  
F-statistic 7.36 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
target firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.5.2 BIDDER FIRMS 
 Tables 4.23, 4.24 and 4.25 contain the results of the regression analysis for 
bidder firms in the bank M&A sample. As was the case with the target firms, the 
target-to-bidder ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
contradicts the results of James and Weir (1987) who find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship. The differing conclusions could be the result of an expanded 
sample and/or a more recent sample period, or possibly because of the general 
increase in the size of the banks in the 1990’s and 21st century compared to the 
1980’s.  
  The method of payment dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in each table presented. This supports the results of the 
independent group t-test where it was found that the capital markets react favorably, 
in the short-term, to M&As financed by a cash or combination payment compared to 
those financed by stock. One plausible explanation for this is that the capital markets 
view a cash or combination payment as a signal that the stock of the bank is fairly or 
undervalued. On the other hand, a stock offer may be seen as a signal that the stock 
is overvalued and hence the price is driven down upon announcement of the M&A. 
 Supporting the results of the test between the difference in the mean CARs to 
geographically focusing and diversifying M&As, the coefficient on the geographic 
dummy variable is insignificant. This adds credibility to the suggestion that the 
capital markets do not distinguish between intrastate and interstate M&As for bidder 
firms as measured by the short-term market reaction to the M&As. 
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 The conclusions based on the individual year dummy variables are not robust 
to changes in the CAR estimation window. The dummy variables for the individual 
years are insignificant in table 4.23, however in tables 4.24 and 4.25 the 1991 and 
1996 dummy variables are positive and significant. In addition, the 2000 dummy 
variable is significant in table 4.24.  
Table 4.23: Bidder CAR Regression: 3-Day (-1, +1) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.0296 1.88 *** 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.0613 -3.74 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0148 4.10 * 
Geographic location dummy variable -0.0029 -0.92 
1990 dummy variable -0.0117 -0.88 
1991 dummy variable 0.0181 1.61 
1992 dummy variable -0.0018 -0.17 
1993 dummy variable 0.0007 0.07 
1994 dummy variable 0.0021 0.21 
1995 dummy variable 0.0071 0.73 
1996 dummy variable 0.0117 1.19 
1997 dummy variable 0.0079 0.83 
1998 dummy variable 0.0039 0.40 
1999 dummy variable -0.0101 -1.04 
2000 dummy variable 0.0057 0.57 
2001 dummy variable 0.0054 0.52 
2002 dummy variable 0.0034 0.30 
2003 dummy variable -0.0001 -0.01 
Adjusted R2 4.46 %  
F-statistic 3.17 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
bidder firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.24: Bidder CAR Regression: 11-Day (-5, +5) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.0227 1.02 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.0659 -2.84 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0162 3.15 * 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0013 0.29 
1990 dummy variable 0.0070 0.37 
1991 dummy variable 0.0356 2.23 ** 
1992 dummy variable 0.0109 0.74 
1993 dummy variable -0.0062 -0.43 
1994 dummy variable 0.0025 0.18 
1995 dummy variable 0.0169 1.21 
1996 dummy variable 0.0253 1.80 ** 
1997 dummy variable 0.0185 1.37 
1998 dummy variable -0.0090 -0.64 
1999 dummy variable -0.0112 -0.80 
2000 dummy variable 0.0235 1.65 *** 
2001 dummy variable 0.0206 1.39 
2002 dummy variable -0.0016 -0.10 
2003 dummy variable -0.0075 -0.38 
Adjusted R2 5.37%  
F-statistic 3.65 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
bidder firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.25: Bidder CAR Regression: 36-Day (-30, +5) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant 0.0202 0.92 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) -0.0620 -2.70 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0161 3.15 * 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0018 0.41 
1990 dummy variable 0.0056 0.30 
1991 dummy variable 0.0337 2.12 ** 
1992 dummy variable 0.0105 0.71 
1993 dummy variable -0.0066 -0.46 
1994 dummy variable 0.0022 0.16 
1995 dummy variable 0.0161 1.16 
1996 dummy variable 0.0240 1.71 *** 
1997 dummy variable 0.0186 1.37 
1998 dummy variable -0.0103 -0.74 
1999 dummy variable -0.0126 -0.91 
2000 dummy variable 0.0229 1.61 
2001 dummy variable 0.0201 1.36 
2002 dummy variable -0.0007 -0.04 
2003 dummy variable -0.0094 -0.48 
Adjusted R2 5.37%  
F-statistic 3.65 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
bidder firms. CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method of 
payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 0 if 
stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.5.3 COMBINED 
 The results of the regression analysis for the combined firm are illustrated in 
tables 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28. Consistent with DeLong (2001), the coefficient on the 
target-to-bidder ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
suggesting that the larger the target firm is relative to the bidder firm, the greater is 
the CAR to the combined firm. This is expected as previous analysis shows that 
target firms realize a higher CAR than bidder firms upon merger announcement and 
the combined CAR calculation utilizes a market value weighting of the target and 
bidder CARs. Furthermore, the method of payment dummy variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level indicating favorable short-term market 
reactions to M&As financed by cash or a combination payment.  
 Results from the group t-test indicated that geographically focusing M&As 
realize a higher mean combined CAR as compared to those that are diversifying. As 
pointed out, this finding was inconsistent with those presented by DeLong (2001) 
who used a regression to study the effects of geographic location on the combined 
CARs. In contrast to the group-test, the geographic dummy variable is statistically 
insignificant and implies that the capital markets do not distinguish between 
intrastate and interstate M&As in the short-run. 
 The annual dummy variables provide interesting insight into the short-term 
market reactions to bank M&As as this allows one to identify years where valuations 
are higher on a consolidated, rather than independent, basis. Of the dummy 
variables, only the 2000 dummy variable coefficient is significant in each table 
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presented. The 1991 and 2001 dummy variable coefficients are significant in tables 
4.26 and 4.27, while 1997 is statistically significant in tables 4.27 and 4.28.  
Table 4.26: Combined CAR Regression: 3-Day (-1, +1) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –1 days before to +1 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant -0.0873 -5.37 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) 0.0946 5.58 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0179 4.79 * 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0007 0.21 
1990 dummy variable 0.0069 0.50 
1991 dummy variable 0.0242 2.09 ** 
1992 dummy variable 0.0046 0.43 
1993 dummy variable 0.0041 0.39 
1994 dummy variable 0.0058 0.57 
1995 dummy variable 0.0116 1.14 
1996 dummy variable 0.0166 1.63 
1997 dummy variable 0.0139 1.42 
1998 dummy variable 0.0078 0.76 
1999 dummy variable 0.0016 0.16 
2000 dummy variable 0.0233 2.25 ** 
2001 dummy variable 0.0225 2.10 ** 
2002 dummy variable 0.0121 1.03 
2003 dummy variable 0.0156 1.09 
Adjusted R2 8.76%  
F-statistic 5.46 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the combined cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR). Combined CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method 
of payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 
0 if stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.27: Combined CAR Regression: 11-Day (-5, +5) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –5 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant -0.0940 -4.20 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) 0.0893 3.83 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0197 3.80 * 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0048 1.08  
1990 dummy variable 0.0158 0.85 
1991 dummy variable 0.0433 2.69 * 
1992 dummy variable 0.0205 1.38  
1993 dummy variable -0.0007 -0.05 
1994 dummy variable 0.0075 0.53 
1995 dummy variable 0.0216 1.54 
1996 dummy variable 0.0319 2.25 ** 
1997 dummy variable 0.0256 1.87 *** 
1998 dummy variable -0.0001 -0.01 
1999 dummy variable 0.0034 0.24 
2000 dummy variable 0.0457 3.19 * 
2001 dummy variable 0.0360 2.42 ** 
2002 dummy variable 0.0083 0.51 
2003 dummy variable 0.0121 0.61 
Adjusted R2 8.89%  
F-statistic 5.55 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the combined cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR). Combined CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method 
of payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 
0 if stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4.28: Combined CAR Regression: 36-Day (-30, +5) Event Window 
Dependent variable: CAR –30 days before to +5 days after the announcement date 
Independent variable Estimate t-statistic 
Constant -0.1498 -3.64 * 
ln(market value of target/market value of bidder) 0.1581 3.68 * 
Method of payment dummy variable 0.0296 3.09 * 
Geographic location dummy variable 0.0083 1.00 
1990 dummy variable -0.0138 -0.40 
1991 dummy variable 0.0282 0.95 
1992 dummy variable 0.0056 0.20 
1993 dummy variable -0.0220 -0.83 
1994 dummy variable 0.0162 0.62 
1995 dummy variable 0.0223 0.86 
1996 dummy variable 0.0256 0.98 
1997 dummy variable 0.0477 1.89 *** 
1998 dummy variable -0.0234 -0.90 
1999 dummy variable -0.0234 -0.90 
2000 dummy variable 0.0659 2.48 ** 
2001 dummy variable 0.0035 0.13 
2002 dummy variable -0.0007 -0.02 
2003 dummy variable -0.0056 -0.15 
Adjusted R2 7.39%  
F-statistic 4.72 *  
Number of observations 795  
This table presents the results of the regression analysis of the combined cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR). Combined CAR is regressed against the natural logarithm of the target-to-bidder ratio, a method 
of payment dummy variable (1 if financed by cash only or a combination of cash, stock, and/or debt, and 
0 if stock only), a geographic location dummy variable (1 if the M&A is intrastate, and 0 if interstate), and 
dummy variables for each year in the sample period. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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4.5.4 SUMMARY 
The results of the regression analysis for the target, bidder, and combined 
firms in the bank merger sample provide for many interesting observations. The 
CARs appear to be driven in part by the relative size of the merger parties. For target 
and bidder firms the smaller the relative size of the target firm to the bidder firm, the 
greater the CAR. Consistent with DeLong (2001), the combined CARs are 
positively related to the target-to-bidder ratio. The results also suggest that the 
capital markets, in the short term, reward the bidder and combined firms of M&As 
financed by cash or combination payments versus stock payments and target CARs 
are higher when the M&A is intrastate versus interstate. Confirming previous 
notions, we also find that the CARs to target firms are higher in latter stages of the 
sample period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This study analyzed the short-term shareholder wealth effects to 854 U.S. 
bank M&As that occurred from 1989 – 2004. To the best of this author’s knowledge 
no other study has analyzed the banking industry using this approach with a sample 
that contained bank M&As in the 21st century. The inclusion of the 21st century is 
important because of corporate and accounting scandals that resulted in investors 
being cautious regarding common stock valuations.  
Using an event study methodology it is found that the CARs to target firms 
are positive and statistically significant, the returns to bidder firms are statistically 
significant and negative, and the combined CARs are positive and statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with the synergy and hubris hypothesis 
wherein bank M&As are wealth-creating events, however, bidders may overpay to 
realize these gains as their management team overestimates their ability to create 
value once they gain control of the target firm’s assets.  
Over the sample period, nearly 75% of the M&As were financed by stock. 
However, the results indicate that the mean CARs to the target, bidder, and 
combined firms are statistically greater for M&As that are financed via cash or a 
combination payment consisting of cash, stock and/or debt compared to those that 
are financed by stock only. The results, however, are driven by the 1999 – 2003 time 
period for target firms where it is found that the CARs are increasing. It is during 
this time period that the percentage of the M&As financed by cash or a combination 
payment increased substantially and where investors became wary of common stock 
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valuations due to accounting scandals that created an environment resulting in a 
preference for cash or combination payments versus stock. For the bidder and 
combined firms, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
the magnitude of the CAR and cash or combination financing for the full sample 
period, however no such relationship exists for target firms. 
To study the effects of the IBBEA, the M&As are analyzed based on 
geographic location. For the target and bidder firms there is no statistical difference 
in the mean abnormal returns based on whether the M&As are geographically 
focusing (intrastate) versus diversifying (interstate). However, the combined mean 
CARs are higher for intrastate M&As for the overall sample period and the 1999 – 
2003 sub-sample period. Although there is no difference in the mean CARs for 
target firms, the regression analysis shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the CAR and whether the M&A is intrastate. 
The CARs are driven in part by the relative size of the merger parties as 
documented in the regression analysis. For target and bidder firms the smaller the 
relative size of the target to the bidder firm, the greater is the CAR. In contrast, the 
combined CAR is positively related to the target-to-bidder ratio. 
Future studies should examine the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 
1999 and in particular, the short-term shareholder wealth effects using a sample that 
contains the 21st century. This would provide insight into whether the capital 
markets distinguish between M&As based on the activities that banking firms are 
engaged in, and also if investor preferences towards these M&As have changed.  
 77
REFERENCES 
Allen, L., Jagtiani, J., Saunders, A., Working Paper 2000. The role of bank advisors 
in mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., Travlos, N., 1990. Corporate control and the choice of 
investment financing: the case of corporate acquisitions. The Journal of 
Finance 45, 603 – 616.  
 
Anderson, C., Becher, D., Campbell II, T., 2004. Bank mergers, the market for bank 
CEOs, and managerial incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 6 – 
27. 
 
Apilado, V., Hart, J., 2002. Inexperienced banks and interstate mergers. Journal of 
Economics and Business 54, 313 – 330. 
 
Bhagat, S., Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., Noah, R., Working Paper 2004. Do tender 
offers create value? New methods and evidence. 
 
Becher, D., 2000. The valuation effects of bank mergers. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 6, 189 – 214. 
 
Becher, D., Campbell II, T., Working Paper 2004. Corporate governance of bank 
mergers.  
 
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J., Poulsen, A., 1991. Event-study methodology under 
conditions of event-induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics 30, 
253 – 272. 
 
Brewer III, E., Jackson III, W., Jagtiani, J., Working Paper 2000. Impact of 
independent directors and the regulatory environment on bank merger prices: 
evidence from takeover activity in the 1990s. 
 
Brook, Y., Hendershott, R., Lee, D., 1998. The gains from takeover deregulation: 
evidence from the end of interstate banking restrictions. The Journal of 
Finance 53, 2185 – 2204. 
 
Brown, S., and Warner, B., 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 8, 3 – 31. 
 
Brown, S., and Warner, B., 1985. Using daily stock returns: the case of event 
studies. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 205 – 258. 
 
Collins, C., Seung-Woog, K., Yildirim, S., Working Paper 2003. An examination of 
the equity market response to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act across 
commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance firms. 
 78
Corrado, C., 1989. A nonparametric test for abnormal security price performance in 
event studies. Journal of Financial Economics 23, 385 – 395. 
 
Cowan, A., 1992. Nonparametric event study tests. Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting 2, 343 – 358. 
 
Cowan, A., Sergeant, A., Working Paper 1996. Trading frequency and event study 
test specification.  
 
Cybo-Ottone, A., Murgia, M., Working Paper 1996. Mergers and acquisitions in the 
European banking markets. 
 
DeLong, G., 2001. Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank 
mergers. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 221 – 252. 
 
DeLong, G., DeYoung, R., Working Paper 2004. Learning by observing: 
information spillovers in the execution and valuation of commercial bank 
M&As. 
 
DePrince, A., Working Paper 2004. Impact of the IBBEA on the structure of the 
U.S. bank system: 1993 – 2003. 
 
Esty, B., Narasimhan, B., Tufano, P., 1999. Interest-rate exposure and bank mergers. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 23, 255 – 285. 
 
Fishman, M., 1989. Preemptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange in 
acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 44, 41 – 57. 
 
Greene, H., 2000. Econometric Analysis. Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall. 
 
Gujarati, D., 2003. Basic Econometrics. Fourth Edition, McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
 
Houston, J., Ryngaert, M., 1994. The overall gains from large bank mergers. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 18, 1155 – 1176. 
 
Houston, J., James, C., Ryngaert, M., 2001. Where do merger gains come from? 
Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders. Journal of 
Financial Economics 60, 285 – 331. 
 
James, C., Weir, P., 1987. Returns to acquirers and competition in the acquisition 
market: the case of banking. Journal of Political Economy 95, 355 – 370. 
 
Pilloff, S., 1996. Performance changes and shareholder wealth creation associated 
with merger of publicly traded banking institutions. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 28, 294 – 310. 
 
 79
Pilloff, S., Santomero, A., Working Paper 1997. The value effects of bank mergers 
and acquisitions. 
 
Roll, R., 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business 59, 
197 – 216. 
 
Serra, A., Working Paper 2002. Event study tests: a brief survery. 
 
Strahan, P., 2003. The real effects of U.S. banking deregulation. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
